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ABSTRACT
The election of Donald Trump reflects the rise of a Right-wing
nationalist movement. Central to Trump’s appeal has been his
advocacy of anti-immigrant, racist, and misogynist ideas. At its
core, his ruling power bloc consists of neo-liberal fundamentalists,
the religious Right, and white nationalists. There are similarities
between the new power bloc and fascism, and there are many
who see Trump’s administration as such. Nevertheless, the new
president’s authoritarian power bloc is neither hegemonic nor
fascist, but such a definition can send oppositional strategy in the
wrong direction.
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Is Donald Trump a fascist? Until recently it’s a question only debated in small circles on
the Left. But now the topic is front and center in media outlets such as the New York Times
and the Washington Post, and a hot subject of discussion across the political class—Left,
Center, and Right.
The question reflects a crisis in neo-liberal hegemony, and it doesn’t have a simple
answer. More important are questions about the social, political, and economic forces
around Trump. Are they fascist as well? Much of the Left views Trump as a dangerous
demagogue who may usher in a neo-fascist and racist regime. But the Left has frequently
used fascism too loosely, labeling fascist everyone from cops swinging their billy clubs to
law-and-order politicians to gun-toting Right-wing militias.
So what makes a particular hegemonic bloc fascist instead of just Right-wing capital-
ism? To answer this question, a more analytical approach is needed, one that understands
capitalism has always been racist, sexist, imperialist, and violent. It has also promoted
bourgeois democracy, which includes important civil liberties and rights, and a social con-
tract that provided workers with middle-class levels of consumption and living standards.
An incorrect assessment of fascism has often had negative consequences for the Left.
Certainly the McCarthy period brought the US close to a fascist state. The Communist
Party believed fascism was on the horizon and sent hundreds of their leading cadre under-
ground. Yet the Communist Party (CP) in California and Michigan (see Pintzuk 1997;
Richmond 1975) continued organizing mass campaigns throughout this period. The
loss of skilled open organizers and hardships suffered in the underground were major fac-
tors in the crisis faced by the CP in 1956–57 leading to the loss of thousands of members
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(Harris 2010). In the late 1960s, the Weathermen faction of Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS) went underground, alongside a splinter group from the Black Panthers
called the Black Liberation Army. Both believed the US faced fascist conditions under
Nixon. Both groups proved ineffective, but with tragic results for their members.
The American ruling class has excelled at repressing leading revolutionary organiz-
ations with violence, jail, and political attacks. Yet democratic rights have been concur-
rently maintained for the majority of US citizens, even as democracy shrank to a fragile
state for the Left. Those under the iron heel of repression see these conditions as a gener-
alized state of fascism for the entire country, at times retreating from using civil liberties as
their best defense. Additionally, cries of fascism did not rally the mass of people to resist-
ance, nor create an effective united front outside relatively small circles of supporters.
What often proved most effective, however, were organizing efforts to defend the Bill of
Rights and civil liberties (see Somerville 2000).
An excellent example in the defense of civil liberties occurred when the Nixon admin-
istration used the FBI and the Justice Department to aggressively infiltrate, surveil, and
prosecute the anti-war movement, the Black Panthers, and Left groups. One famous
case that went to the US Supreme Court was entitled U.S. versus District Court [1972]
407 U. S. 297. This was a blatant attempt to set a precedent of restricting civil liberties
in the name of national security.
Members of the White Panthers (centred in Detroit) were prosecuted for conspiracy
to destroy government property, including the bombing of a CIA office in Ann Arbor,
Michigan. The defense attorneys made a motion to discover any wiretaps. Previously, in
political cases, the Justice Department would simply deny the existence of wiretaps and
judges would accept the prosecutors’ word. But in this case, to everyone’s shock, the
prosecutors admitted wiretaps and admitted there had been no warrants. Wanting to
establish the government’s power in future cases, they argued that under the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 they didn’t need a warrant when there was a
clear and present danger to “domestic security.” In addition, the government’s brief
took the extreme position that the President had “the inherent power” to suspend
any provision of the Constitution when he determined it was in the national interest.
The brief written by Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist (later to become
the Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court) concluded that pursuant to such power
the government could disregard the Fourth Amendment’s protection against warrantless
searches.
If the Supreme Court accepted the government’s argument, there would have been a
legal basis for the President to carry out surveillance and prosecute any political opposition
without the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Court, in a unanimous decision, written
by Nixon appointee and conservative Justice Lewis Powell, strongly rejected the govern-
ment’s arguments. This is one of many examples of a conservative court protecting civil
liberties during a period of powerful federal and state law-and-order attacks on Left pol-
itical movements.
These periods are complex and intense. Among Marxist thinkers, Gramsci’s insights on
the dialectic of coercion and consent under capitalist rule best explains times in which
state power is employed to destroy Left influence while maintaining a general democratic
institutional structure for the rest of society; enough so that both McCarthy and Nixon
were disgraced and expelled from power, not by the Left, but by leading sectors of the
2 J. HARRIS ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [9
8.2
19
.21
6.1
78
] a
t 0
6:0
2 1
5 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
capitalist class. Nixon and McCarthy were useful in creating reactionary conditions and
using state power against radicals, but when they turned their attacks to sectors of the rul-
ing class they were quickly done away with. In McCarthy’s case, it was his intent to inves-
tigate communist influence in the military, and for Nixon it was the Watergate spying
scandal with his private, extra-legal gang of “plumbers.” Their political operatives and
allies lost influence and some were even jailed.
If these periods posed the danger of a fascist hegemonic bloc, that political movement
and their thrust for total power was defeated essentially by splits in the ruling class more so
than mass action from below. Some of those splits were over fundamental ideological pos-
itions concerning democracy, while other divisions were in reaction to the social move-
ments and how to incorporate their demands into the system. Today these same
dynamics are at play over Trump’s presidential victory, and so history lays the ground-
work for what is to come.
Historic Fascism and Today
It is important not to get lost in personalities. Is Trump a fascist, an accomplished oppor-
tunist, or just an egocentric billionaire looking for personal power? That discussion may be
interesting, but fascism as a historic hegemonic bloc features a radical, even revolutionary,
break with bourgeois democracy. A comparison between historic fascism and today’s con-
ditions is a good place to start. But it’s also important to avoid an exact comparison with
the German Nazis or Italian fascists. If those conditions have to be repeated in all their
essentials, we will never see fascism again, since history rarely repeats in such exact pat-
terns. Just as new revolutions can break the mold of those before it, so can counter-
revolutions.
Historically fascism has grown out of deep capitalist economic and social crises, chal-
lenged from below by Left and Right revolutionary movements, leaving the ruling class
unable to rule in the old way. This standoff creates a crack in the ceiling that leads to
the open dictatorship of the most reactionary sections of the capitalist class.
Right-wing populism (and its variants) holds nationally specific forms. There is no one-
size-fits-all, though there are significant points in common. These include racism, sexism,
xenophobia, and the obsession on an “origin myth,” i.e., a period in the nation or people’s
history that was allegedly glorious.
Yet there is another aspect to Right-wing populism, which certainly can work itself into
fascism: irrationalism. When we use the term “irrationalism” we are discussing a frame-
work which is specifically anti-science, anti-fact, deeply imbued with conspiracy theories
and frequently laced with myth. Such movements have occurred periodically in the United
States. The current obsession with the problem of “fake news,” for instance, ignores the
historical precedent of “yellow journalism” in the lead-up to the Spanish-American
War. But irrationalism runs deeper than phony journalism. Embedded in the history of
Right-wing populism there is an appeal to the irrational, rooted in a fear of the unknown
and a fear of the future.
The anti-science of irrationalism can paradoxically appear to be very scientific. Nazi
Germany is certainly a case in point where there was the concurrence of both irrational
myth and rational science with the irrational myth coded as scientific. Not only was scien-
tific racism popular in Germany, it was also widespread in the United States.
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Irrationalism serves an important role in the reinforcing of a delusional bubble that sur-
rounds the mass base of Right-wing populism. Central to Right-wing populism is the cre-
ation of a narrative that describes how the “people” have been victimised by specific elites
(usually demographic groups). The retreat from science and fact leads to the creation of
stories that are frequently intriguing, and reinforce the basic narrative. This can take
the form of the outlandish, to more subtle falsehoods like misstating what proportion
of terrorist attacks in the US are committed by Muslims versus white supremacists.
The difficulty presented by irrationalism is that facts are irrelevant because all that actu-
ally matters is the story. If the facts get in the way of the story, then the facts are eliminated
and either ignored outright, or replaced with reinforcing information, irrespective of its
truth or falsehood. Consequently, Trump can constantly state falsehoods, such as millions
of illegal voters in the presidential election, and the story is believed even when contra-
dicted by facts. The irrational narrative speaks directly to people’s identity and their per-
ceived place in society. To reject the story one must reject their identity, for example, as a
white male suffering discrimination, or a Christian defender of freedom against Muslim
terrorists.
Today capitalism faces a generalised economic and social crisis, but over the past eight
years there has been a slow and shallow recovery. Conditions are bad or stagnating for
many, but still don’t compare to the Great Depression of the 1930s and the carnage haunt-
ing countries after WWI. Nevertheless, the ruling class does face a crisis of legitimacy, a
widespread mistrust and anger at political elites and Wall Street bankers.
Both the Republican and Democratic parties face internal challenges that reflect these
general conditions. To make sense of these conflicts it is useful to consider the political
landscape as a six-“party” system, rather than the usual two-party binary: three under
the GOP tent and three under the Democratic tent (Davidson 2016). Although these fac-
tions have important differences, it’s essential to note that neo-liberal ideology and trans-
national capitalists have maintained hegemony in both parties for the past 35 years.
In the GOP, the biggest loser in the election was the “establishment” faction, the neo-
liberal globalists led by the Bush family. They were challenged by a variety of groupings
under the old Tea Party label that morphed into two new groupings—the Christian
nationalists under Senator Ted Cruz, and the Right-wing populists fashioned by Trump
and the “Alt-Right” under Steve Bannon.
Throughout the primaries, Trump routed all 16 opponents, leaving Right-wing popu-
lism with the upper hand. By the GOP convention, Trump took command by bringing
Mike Pence, a Cruz ally, on as his running mate. The anti-global white nationalists,
both secular and Christian, were in the driver’s seat, while the establishment was left either
in disarray or in open revolt, with a number of neo-liberals turning temporarily to the
Democrats.
The Democratic tent also had three groupings—the Third Way faction under the Clin-
tons and much of Wall Street, and their allies among civil rights and women’s rights
groups; the Old New Dealers comprised largely of the AFL-CIO, related think tanks,
and figures like Senator Elizabeth Warren and Vice President Joseph Biden; and finally
the Social-Democrats (for want of a better term) made up of the Congressional Progressive
Caucus, Progressive Democrats of America, Working Families Party, and Senator Bernie
Sanders along with his many allies among young voters.
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The Sanders campaign far exceeded expectations. As a self-defined democratic socialist
he ran on a progressive, popular front program aimed at making a “political revolution”
against the “billionaire class” on Wall Street. Sanders was the only anti-neo-liberal in the
primaries. Although Trump spoke out against globalization, there was no mention of core
neo-liberal policies such as deregulation or tax breaks for the rich. He never attacked the
“billionaire class,” instead his targets were minorities, immigrants, women, and the “rigged
system.”
For Sanders, a new, large sector of the electorate emerged. At its core were the Millen-
nial “precariat,” largely younger workers, unemployed or under-employed, and heavily
burdened with student debt and minimum wages. While Clinton maintained a solid
majority of older minority voters, many younger Millennials of color also responded to
Bernie. In the end, after featuring a run of huge and insurgent rallies, Sanders had 13
million votes and took 45% of the elected delegates to the convention. It enabled them
to help write the most progressive party platform in its history. For the sake of her cam-
paign Clinton was pulled leftward, but couldn’t overcome her 35-history as a Wall Street
neo-liberal. Even so, in the end she beat Trump by 2.8 million votes.
Will the insurgent populist nationalists of the Right or the insurgent social-democrats
of the Left fully take over the leadership and change the character of their respective par-
ties? If the Right populists are successful, they could potentially constitute an important
element in a new neo-liberal-fascist ruling hegemonic bloc. On the left, it could mean
the emergence of a new social democratic, counter-hegemonic bloc.
In the interest of examining the question of fascism in the United States, let’s focus on
whether Trump’s victory signals a new power bloc or a hegemonic bloc.
A New Hegemonic Bloc?
A new power bloc would be a significant shift in ruling class orientation, bringing together
a diverse alliance of different interests. The Republican Party has been subject to internal
divisions and battles for many years, riven by debates over nationalism, globalization, and
transnational capitalism.
Previous presidential candidates John McCain and Mitt Romney showed the domi-
nance of the transnational capitalist class (TCC). For the past 35 years the TCC has main-
tained neo-liberal political and ideological hegemony, built upon economic globalization.
As state policy neo-liberalism ruled both the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as
conservative and social-democratic parties in Europe. It was the clear ruling-class
consensus.
But the Trump victory has shaken things up, shifting political leadership to the populist
Right-wing base. So far the Republican alliance, while disrupted, still holds and a new
hegemonic bloc has not been established. This is partly because reactionary nationalism
has not been accepted as an ideology by the TCC. It runs counter to the multicultural
and cosmopolitan orientation necessary for globalization. Moreover, the TCC neo-Keyne-
sian wing still in the Democratic Party is in clear opposition.
The reactionary nationalist power bloc in the Republican Party is also in a different pos-
ition than fascism in the 1930s. Presently US fascism lacks its own consolidated political
instrument. Twentieth-century fascism constructed its own party, created a hegemonic
bloc with a dominant ideology, won full state control, and suppressed all opposition.
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So, an important question is can reactionary nationalists turn the Republican Party into a
fully-fledged fascist party? This would be a radical break, converting a conservative party
into a revolutionary political instrument intent on taking full power.
Historically, fascist parties not only were new political instruments, they also brought
forth a whole set of new political elites. That Tea Party operatives, Christian theocrats, and
Alt-Right activists have influence and pose a danger is without question. But will that
influence consolidate into a leading position within a hegemonic bloc?
The appointment of Stephen Bannon as Trump’s senior counselor is a clear indication
that white nationalists will be at the table of power. Bannon’s Breibart media outlet has run
headlines such as, “Hoist It High and Proud: The Confederate Flag Proclaims a Glorious
History,” and “Birth Control Makes Women Unattractive and Crazy.” His appointment
by Trump got rave reviews from the American Nazi Party, the Klan, and other Alt-
Right elements. This amalgamation of different racist groups and militias, such as the
Oath Keepers, can certainly constitute a paramilitary force similar to the Brown Shirts
in the early days of German fascism. Alt-Right leading ideologue Richard Spencer has sta-
ted, “America was, until this last generation, a white country designed for ourselves and
our posterity. It is our creation, it is our inheritance, and it belongs to us” (Editorial
Board 2016).
Granted, the Alt-Right lacks the direct organizational ties to the Republican Party that
paramilitary forces possessed with the Nazi Party. And soon after the election Trump
made statements putting distance between himself and the most racist Alt-Right elements.
More recently he downgraded the status of Bannon. However Trump may still turn to
Bannon and his Alt-Right network to mobilize their base in the 2018 elections, threatening
civil liberties and possible violence. Conservatives can then keep their hands clean and
declare their commitment to democracy, while indirectly promoting repression.
But will Trump bring Alt-Right activists into government? Using the state for building a
large fascist bureaucracy was an important step in establishing a consolidated power base
in the past century. So it will be important to track the 4000 presidential appointments to
see if reactionary and racist cadre are being widely placed and promoted. Six months into
his administration this does not appear to be the case.
A parallel development to the 1930s is the international character of the rising fascist
danger. Throughout Europe, Right-wing nationalist and neo-fascist parties have been
marching in the streets and winning at the ballot box. Similar to Trump’s, their political
rhetoric is rooted in anti-globalism, nationalist pride, and anti-immigrant attacks.
But important differences remain. One is the historic legacy directly linking some of
these parties to twentieth-century European fascism. Another is their independence
from traditional conservative parties whom they blame (alongside the social democrats)
for elite corruption and loss of sovereignty to the European Union bureaucracy.
By contrast, the reactionary Right in the United States is situated inside the major con-
servative party, and therefore entangled in a whole host of organizational and financial ties
that the European nationalists are free of. The theocratic Right, the Tea Party, and now
Trump have all sought power within the existing traditional conservative political organ-
ization. Will this strategy mean compromising with, or even a minority relationship to the
TCC? Or will it tie the TCC more firmly to reactionary nationalists and fascist elements?
At this point the TCC remains the dominant partner and have strengthened their influ-
ence in the White House, particularly over economic issues.
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Elite Opposition and Support
As already noted, US neo-liberal politicians, who have long done the bidding of the trans-
national capitalist class have strong roots in both the Democratic Party and Republican
Party (Harris 2016). Rather than moving decisively to the Left or Right they are trying
to maintain their political hegemony through minor adjustments. For example, Left reg-
ulationists such as Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, and investor George Soros, have moved
to a clear neo-Keynesian position. Meanwhile, the center structuralists, like Lawrence
Summers, Mark Carney, governor of the Bank of England, and Christine Lagarde, head
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), now argue for an “inclusive capitalism.” At
war with each other during the Asian crisis in 1998, these two factions now share
broad general agreement on debt relief, state-led investments, rising wages, and repairing
the social safety net.
These players have also recognized the seriousness of the environmental threat, and
some are already investing significant amounts of money into sustainable technologies.
Outspoken advocates of market-based green policies include Robert Ruben, former Treas-
ury Secretary under Bill Clinton and Citigroup executive; Hank Paulson, former Treasury
Secretary under GeorgeW. Bush and former CEO of Goldman Sachs; andMichael Bloom-
berg, billionaire and former mayor of New York. All are important voices in the TCC.
In this regard, the appointment of Scott Pruitt to head the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), a representative of the fossil fuel industry and constant opponent of the
EPA, will be an important point of conflict. Issues over science and sustainability will
be a major point of opposition, not only with an energized environmental movement,
but among the elite. It’s not just that this faction of the TCC are uncomfortable with
the likes of Pruitt and Bannon; they have a very different strategy to solve the economic
impasse and social crisis faced by transnational capitalism—one that involves market-
based environmentalism, letting wages rise, and expanding open borders for trade and
investments.
Therefore, oppositional TCC factions may play an important role in blocking the ascen-
sion of the hard Right, and any political moves to silence and punish them would be a bold
marker to signify the full arrival of fascism. On the other end of the TCC spectrum are the
transnational, free-market ideologues, what Soros calls “market fundamentalists.” These
figures from the TCC Right wing are mainly centered in finance capital. They are clearly
happy with the Trump victory and looking forward to significant weakening of the finan-
cial regulations that became legislation after the 2008 crash.
Trump’s cabinet appointments are a clear indication that he intends to pursue cher-
ished neo-liberal policies, many already discredited except among Right-wing fundamen-
talists of the TCC. These include major tax breaks for the rich, deregulation of finance and
energy, privatization of the infrastructure, and charter schools to undermine public edu-
cation. In short, Trump is bringing back the Washington Consensus.
Inside the fossil-fuel industry the champagne bottles are being uncorked, as transna-
tional investors are looking forward to a president who rejects global warming science.
We already see signs of this by way of Trump’s investment in Energy Transfer Partners,
the corporation in conflict with Native Americans at Standing Rock Indian Reservation.
CEO billionaire Kelcy Warren was a strong supporter of Trump, and the new president
is supporting the company in its confrontation over land and water rights.
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Trump’s cabinet is a carefully constructed alliance between TCC neo-liberals, the theo-
cratic Right (Davidson and Harris 2006), and Alt-Right nationalists. Representing the
TCC is Rex Tillerson, CEO from Exxon-Mobile as Secretary of State; billionaire and for-
mer Goldman Sachs partner Steven Mnuchin at Treasury; president of Goldman Sachs
Gary Cohn as head of the Council of Economic Advisors; and private equity billionaire
Wilbur Ross as Commerce Secretary.
Alt-Right and Goldman Sachs alumni Stephen Bannon is senior strategist. The theo-
cratic Right is represented by Vice President Pence, Attorney General Jeff Sessions; Hous-
ing and Urban Development under Ben Carson; Tom Price as Secretary of Health and
Human Services; and Betsy DeVos at the Department of Education (Stewart 2016). A
quick examination of the appointments shows all important economic posts are in the
hands of transnational capitalists, while positions covering social issues have gone to
the theocratic Right. The key to this alliance and its construction as a power bloc is devo-
tion to orthodox neo-liberalism in its most brutal and naked form.
Trump’s appointments reflect his own global business dealings. He has investments in
20 countries including the United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bermuda, Brazil,
Canada, China, Dominican Republic, Scotland, Germany, Indonesia, India, Ireland, South
Korea, Saint Martin, Panama, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Uruguay, and
is deeply involved with rich and powerful families in the global North and South. And
while real estate is an important area for TCC investments, being one of the most active
fields attracting transnational capital, Trump’s opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) does not affect his real estate empire. His company engages in foreign direct invest-
ments and branding rather than the import/export trade.
Do these sections of capital constitute the most reactionary bloc willing to align with
white nationalists to create fascist hegemony? Certainly a majority of finance capitalists
and their orthodox ideologues promote authoritarian and technocratic political insti-
tutions devoted to austerity, while the fossil fuel industry is committed to bringing
every remaining drop of oil and coal to the surface in their profit-driven mania to destroy
the environment.
Yet such goals have been promoted for the past 30 years through the World Trade
Organization, IMF, and the false science of Exxon-Mobil. Just how far an economic
and political fusion with the Alt-Right will go remains to be seen.
But in such an alliance there is no solution to stagnation, and any fascist hegemony may
quickly be undermined by its inability to solve the social crisis. Additionally, market fun-
damentalists want to use the state to reduce political regulations. But traditional fascism
greatly expanded the state-run economy, with contracts and profits running through
the government and doled out to supporting corporations. As Benito Mussolini commen-
ted in 1925: “Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State.”
State activism versus free market capitalism is an underlying tension in the Trump pre-
sidency, and reflects a contradiction between the Republican base and its Wall Street
establishment that has been its central internal dynamic for the past 20 years.
As Mike Davis has observed:
On social security, Medicare, deficit spending on infrastructure, tariffs, technology, and so
on, it’s almost impossible to imagine a perfect marriage between Trump and the institutional
Republicans that doesn’t orphan his working-class supporters . . . Therefore it would not be
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difficult to imagine a future scenario where the alt-right ultimately splits with or is expelled
from the administration. (Davis 2016)
Trump may try to solve this problem by using his nationalist rhetoric to hide corporate
privatization. His big job programs are rebuilding the infrastructure, and the wall on
the Mexican border. Infrastructure construction may be accomplished by private–state
partnerships in which large amounts of tax money helps subsidize corporate construction.
The corporations would then own the projects and charge user fees to both the govern-
ment and private citizens for new roads, sewers, and ports. It can also serve as a large-
scale jobs program that keeps his popular base of support.
The biggest policy departure between the nationalist and transnational wings of the
reactionary power bloc will be over the cancellation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP). Trump needs to keep his promise to maintain legitimacy with his social base.
This is a hard pill to swallow for transnational elites who have worked long and hard to
create the treaty. But in the end it will not stop, or even long stall, globalization. Already
the Chinese have made use of the new opportunity to increase their influence and role in
defining globalization. China has been working on a trade deal called the Regional Com-
prehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Its 16-member bloc already encompasses seven
of the twelve countries involved in the TPP including Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Sin-
gapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. India is an additional member, and China has now
invited in Latin American TPP participants Peru and Chile. At the summit of the 21-
country Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group held in November, Chinese president
Xi Jinping was clearly ready to take advantage of the US rejection of the TPP, stating,
“China will not shut the door to the outside world but will open it even wider” (Kohlmann
2016).
Instead of creating more US jobs, pulling out of the TPP will increase the transnatio-
nalization of US-headquartered corporations. As Deborah Elms, executive director of
the Asian Trade Center in Singapore commented, “American companies will be at a com-
petitive disadvantage. They will, in a final irony, likely outsource more to Asia because in
order to use the existing trade agreements in Asia, they will need to be physically located in
Asia” (Kohlmann 2016). Consequently, nationalist rhetoric and moves will only serve to
weaken US state leadership of the TCC. Combined with Obama’s boycott of the widely
popular Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank established by China, and China’s One
Belt One Road initiative, it is not hard to see the shifting of history.
So does the Trump victory put a fascist coalition in the driver’s seat, or will Trump act
as populist cover for the continued neo-liberal rule of the TCC-dominant faction?
A similar debate has long been part of the discussion over twentieth-century fascism.
Was the bloc’s political wing in the form of the Nazi Party the dominant partner, or
was industrial and finance capital? Rather than either, it can be argued it was a mutual
merger of interests that drove power relations. But with much of the Republican apparatus
first and foremost loyal to Wall Street, it may be difficult for fascist political dominance to
occur with white nationalists driving the power bloc. It is clear from Trump’s cabinet
appointments of billionaires and Wall Street connected elites that Trump has tied himself
to finance capital. He will make a show of nationalist political acts, and pursue anti-immi-
gration policies to maintain his social base. But the heart of the power bloc will be the neo-
liberal fundamentalist wing of the TCC.
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Consequently, in terms of economic policies, transnational hegemony is likely to con-
tinue in much the same form that it did under Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush, George
W. Bush and Barak Obama. Certainly more openly racist and aggressive in form, but neo-
liberal and transnational in essence.
Civil Liberties, State Terrorism, and Military Expansion
Marxist Darko Suvin argues that
there is no fascism without extreme, mass, and terrorizing violence; there is no fascist State
without international warfare . . . Under fascist State rule . . . an alliance or historical block
shares power with the fascist hierarchy. It consists as a rule of top capitalist businesses, the
military, and the inherited and now swollen conservative State bureaucracy: in no case
does the upper bourgeoisie lose its profits, though a part or most of its macro-planning
power is subordinated to State coordination and norms. (Suvin 2016)
Suvin’s description of twentieth-century fascism presents signiﬁcant differences with
today’s conditions. He positions a total suppression of democratic rights, a state-managed
economy, and international warfare with the military as key elements in a fascist hegemo-
nic bloc.
Considering the role of the military is a question with no easy answer. Clinton was seen
as having a more pro-military stand than Trump, who questioned the US alliance with
NATO, criticized the war in Iraq, and attacked Senator John McCain for his war record.
Among active duty service men and women Clinton won by a 5% margin, suggesting a
weak military social base for providing a core element in a reactionary bloc. In fact,
Trump’s message veered more to isolationism than expansionism. As he stated during
the campaign:
We would be so much better off if Gadhafi were in charge right now. If these politicians went
to the beach and didn’t do a thing, and we had Saddam Hussein and if we had Gadhafi in
charge, instead of having terrorism all over the place, at least they killed terrorists, all
right? . . . We destabilised the Middle East and it is a mess . . . I mean I’m not a fan of Saddam
Hussein, but he ran the place. And, he had no weapons of mass destruction. And now instead
of Saddam Hussein, we have far more brutal. We have ISIS. (Parenti 2016)
At the same time Trump supports torture, the bombing of civilians, and harsh security
measures against all Muslims. He also called for enlarging the already bloated military
budget. Writing in the business magazine Forbes, weapons industry consultant Loren
Thompson wrote, “For the Defence Industry, Trump’s Win Means Happy Days are
Here Again” (Hartung 2016). In the stock market post-election surge defense industry
giants such as Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman were major winners.
Fascism in the twentieth century linked nationalism to war, and the quest for more ter-
ritory and resources. This was a hallmark feature of its character. Trump has not pursued
this path, and it is hard to imagine his regime expanding the US war effort to a qualitat-
ively greater extent than Bush one and two, or Obama’s eight years of drone assassinations.
In fact Obama’s military budget out-spent George W. Bush (Hartung 2016). This raises a
number of questions. Is a leap in military aggression a necessary step towards fascism,
when a permanent war economy was established well before Trump’s victory? If the US
acts as the military spearhead for the transnational capitalist class (Robinson 2004)
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does a continuation of global imperialism constitute a newly characterized transnational
fascist aggression? Or does fascist aggression necessitate a sharp turn towards a narrow
nationalist military agenda, for example, reserving rights to Iraqi oil for US corporations
while shutting out China, France, and others who have signed contracts with the local
government?
Within the military there are many schools of thought. Some see Russia as the main
enemy, others advocate containment of China as the most important strategic concern.
Still others are primarily focused on the “arc” of terrorism they see stretching from north-
ern Africa to Asia. There are even globalists who recognize the US must adjust to a multi-
polar world and ready itself for a mass of ecological refugees (Harris 2002, 2008). Trump
does not seem to be rooted to any camp, and has already departed from his campaign
rhetoric. One clear impulse has emerged, his military advisors want to promote a more
aggressive stance than the Obama administration was willing to take, and Trump seems
to agree.
The other side of violence and repression is the security state and its threat to democ-
racy. Trump began his relationship with the CIA with insults, and rejected their findings
on Russian interference in the US elections. Yet it is clearly evident that Trump and his
anti-Muslim policies have deep support in the FBI, the border police, and Right-wing mili-
tias. With the appointment of Senator Jeff Sessions to Attorney General, undermining civil
rights will play a prominent role in Trump’s use of power. The FBI may not only support,
but be enthusiastic in helping to deport three million immigrants and register all Muslims.
The question of democratic norms and legality is an essential difference between fas-
cism and the normative bourgeois state. Bob Jessop explores this question in his analysis
of Nicholas Poulantzas’s well-known work on fascism. As Jessop explains:
Poulantzas’s analysis of the exceptional state derives from his view that the definitive features
of the normal form of the capitalist type of state are democratic institutions and hegemonic
class leadership . . . However, if political and ideological crises cannot be resolved through the
normal, democratic play of class forces, democratic institutions must be suspended or elimi-
nated and the crises resolved through an open “war of manoeuvre” that ignores consti-
tutional niceties . . . Thus, while consent predominates over constitutionalized violence in
normal states, exceptional states intensify physical repression and conduct an “open war”
against dominated classes. (Jessop 2014)
Jessop goes on to explain that exceptional states suspend elections and end the multiparty
system of political competition. Constitutional legality is deferred, the freedom of press
ended, and a centralization of power reorganizes hegemony while suppressing internal
opposition (see Jessop 2014; Poulantzas 1974). If we accept the importance Poulantzas
gives to the division between democracy and dictatorship in the deﬁnition of fascism
then Trump and the new power bloc is far from a consolidated hegemonic fascism. It con-
tains elements and possibilities of fascism, but is closer to authoritarian state transnation-
alism than a dictatorship of reactionary nationalism.
Race and Class
What has fuelled charges of fascism more than anything else has been Trump’s use of
racism and xenophobia to energize his social base. In post-election analysis the working
class has become the focus of attention, with pundits suddenly discovering the pain,
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inequality, and hardships suffered as a result of 35 years of neo-liberal globalization and
technological changes.
But when the media and politicians talk about the working class, they mean the white
working class, and eliminate millions of blacks and Latinos from what is in reality a multi-
racial working class. Instead blacks and Latinos are assigned a “minority” identity, reinfor-
cing the white viewpoint that minorities are just welfare recipients that take advantage of
tax dollars.
Without a doubt, a good deal of Trump’s vote was a vote against globalization and
Washington elites. But a good section of Trump voters responded strongly to his racist
appeals, with the white nationalist/supremacist community openly rallying to his side.
And more broadly, to vote for Trump was to ignore or downplay all his vulgar racist
and xenophobic statements. The hurt, fear, and insult felt by millions of minorities was
less important than people’s desire for “change.” Although not a change to the racist cul-
ture and history in the US.
This is a white blind spot, and a form of racism central to US history. We’re sure many
of these people have minority friends at work or church and do not consider themselves
racist. But they are willfully blind to structural racism and its daily consequences. Some
voted for Obama as an agent of change, again change was more important than race.
So race as a secondary or unimportant factor ironically can work both ways. You do
not have to belong to the Klan, spray paint swastikas on a synagogue, or write “nigger”
on a bathroom wall to be a racist. It runs deep in US culture and this election shows
just how deep it is.
Early exit poll results conducted by the New York Times (Huang et al. 2016) raise
further questions about the relationship of class and race. Clinton biggest gap was
among those earning $50,000 to $99,999. This large sector of the working class broke
for Trump 51% to 42%. Certainly a family earning between $50,000 to $75,000 dollars
a year may be struggling to pay their bills and keep their heads above water. This
would include the blue-collar counties going for Trump. The second half of this bracket
is moderately well off, and not as badly affected by globalization, but there has been a stag-
nation in their income and lifestyle. They see and fear a bleak future in which their security
and living standards are threatened. Those who feel “worse off today” went heavily for
Trump at 78%. But we must remember those really worse off, and living on incomes
below $50,000, went for Clinton.
Trump’s strength in rural America follows the pattern of solid rural support for fascism
in Germany, Italy, and Spain. Isolation from diversity, and the cosmopolitan and indus-
trial culture of big cities is reflected in the conservatism and religious-centered community
of rural life. The most consistent demographic divide in the election was between urban
and rural voters. Furthermore, Trump won large sectors of small- and mid-size business
people who responded to attacks on foreign trade, globalization, and urban elites.
But what might be an additional explanation in the analysis of the Trump vote beyond
income or class? Some 64% of Trump voters said immigration was the most important
issue. Their next most common category was the threat of terrorism. Those who thought
the economy was the most important problem went 52% for Clinton, and 42% for Trump
(Huang et al. 2016). Clearly Trump’s appeal to racism and xenophobia paid off well, and
may have been his key to success. Similar electoral strategy has been successful for past
Republican campaigns, and played well for some Democrats.
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Trump’s open and crass racist appeals were new to modern political presidential cam-
paigns. But the not-so-subtle Willie Horton ads under George Bush were only a camou-
flage difference of degree. So too was Ronald Regan’s “welfare queens driving Cadillacs,”
and Bill Clinton’s promise to “end welfare as we know it.” Does this make Trump a fascist
or an opportunist and dangerous racist?
Even liberal presidents have carried out racist policies. Roosevelt put Japanese Ameri-
cans into concentration camps and Obama deported 2.5 million immigrants. The US has
had openly racist presidents, among those were Woodrow Wilson and Richard Nixon,
both of whom violated democratic norms. Wilson oversaw the Palmer raids that deported
500 radical activists, and fought against the right of women to vote. Under Presidents
Harding and Coolidge, the 1920s witnessed a rapid growth of the Klan in the Midwest.
By 1923 Indiana’s Klan reached 250,000 members, and over half of Indiana’s state
house, the governor, and many high-ranking officials were loyal Klan supporters. When
the Klan marched in Washington DC in 1925 it was estimated at 60,000. If there was
ever fascist conditions in the US they certainly existed during this era in the South,
where Blacks were denied basic civil and political rights and the rule of terror was punc-
tuated by chain gangs and lynchings.
Today, even with the oppression of the prison industrial complex, police killings, and
immigration prison camps, general democratic conditions are better for minorities. So can
we define the current conditions as fascist, when racist oppression and racist movements
have been a constant part of US history?
Although Trump openly and crudely appealed to racist beliefs, is this so qualitatively
different to make him a fascist, and all that entails, rather than a patriarchal American
racist? For all the faux cries of disbelief and rejection by the Republican establishment,
they and Republican voters all came home to Trump on election day. But consolidating
a white nationalist hegemonic bloc may be a bridge too far for Trump’s social base. In
all, 20% of his voters reported little confidence and tepid support. And even while
many Americans hold biased beliefs, the majority are what we might label benign racists.
Their slogan may well be “why can’t we all get along,” uncomfortable with minority
demands for equality, but also white nationalism and openly repressive policies. As we
argued above, nearly all Trump voters were racist, but only a minority are white
nationalists.
Xenophobia and Patriarchy
Patriarchal and racist worldviews were embedded in fundamentalist Protestant religion,
which was the dominant ideological influence on the Scottish and Irish settlers of
America. Poverty was an indication of personal failure and economic success an indi-
cation of righteousness. The religious Right wing, a powerful faction inside the Repub-
lican Party, was attracted to Trump’s racial message and nationalist rhetoric enough so
that Trump got 81% of the evangelist vote, and enough so that Trump’s misogynist
character did not stop support from the “family value” cultural warriors of the theo-
cratic Right.
Christian fundamentalists are bolstered by generous support from a number of super-
rich families and foundations, and have a deep network of think tanks and media outlets.
The religious Right sees globalization as secularization, and multiculturalism and religious
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tolerance as a challenge to Christian identity. Consequently, Trump’s rejection of globa-
lization and promotion of nationalism and isolationism provided a strong attraction for
Christian identity voters.
Pat Buchanan, who has long been a major intellectual spokesman for Right-wing Chris-
tians, has targeted immigration as a major threat to America. This issue, perhaps more
than any other, brought evangelists to Trump. His characterization of Mexican immi-
grants as “murderers and rapists” was music to the ears of the theocratic Right. In Bucha-
nan’s book, The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions
Imperil our Country and Civilization, he wrote:
There are thus deep differences in attitudes toward America between old immigrants from
Ireland, Italy and Eastern Europe and today’s immigrants from Mexico . . . Mexicans not
only come from another culture, but millions are of another race . . . Unlike immigrants of
old, who bade farewell forever to their native lands . . . Mexicans have no desire to learn Eng-
lish . . . rather than assimilate, they create Little Tijuanas in US cities . . . they are creating an
Hispanic culture separate and apart from America’s larger culture. They are becoming a
nation within a nation. (Buchanan 2002)
The easy answer to this problem of a “nation within a nation” is mass deportations and a
border wall to protect the Christian and racial purity of the “old immigrants.” But this
anti-immigration stance conﬂicts with capitalists who rely on cheap labor. Joachim Fels,
global economic adviser for Paciﬁc Investment Management, a company that manages
$1.5 trillion in assets, spoke for transnational capital when he stated, “greater barriers
to immigration reduce competition for domestic workers and thus lead to higher
wage growth” (Miller 2016). It will be hard for the new power bloc to round this square
hole.
The misogynist and sexual boasting of Trump did put off a good number of Christians,
but the subordination of women has always been part of fundamentalist religions around
the world. Men want a world where they control the household, control their women, and
earn the most money. These beliefs are particularly strong when they are supported by
conservative religious views. The loss of industrial jobs and women’s entry into the work-
force has undercut traditional family roles and male identity. The right to an abortion and
cultural changes in the independence and self-reliance of women have also challenged
patriarchal social structures of domination. Being rich, having a beautiful wife, and freely
boasting of sexual encounters appealed to many men. This is the life they want to live.
Consequently, Trump attracted the religious Right in a number of important ways, and
their alliance may strengthen in the future.
Conclusion
The Trump power bloc shares many similarities to classic fascism, and yet has significant
differences. Trump has used populist rhetoric to capture the anger and frustration over
economic inequality brought about by neo-liberal globalization. The emerging power
bloc is marked by white nationalism and reactionary religious support. Both have orga-
nized social movements, with strong support in rural areas. Xenophobic rhetoric has
laid the groundwork for scapegoating all Muslims and immigrants, perhaps as a spearhead
in a frontal assault on all civil liberties. Reactionary elements in the state security apparatus
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have given Trump their political backing. And in finance capital the most orthodox neo-
liberals, alongside the anti-environmental energy sector, are rejoicing with high expec-
tations of policies that will favor their industry and profits.
On the other hand, there is significant opposition within the ruling class. Important
sectors still support formal democratic legality and environmental sustainability. There
is no fascist party with a large set of new cadre ready to take over the state bureaucracy.
The Republican Party is still a coalition of neo-liberal transnational capitalists and reac-
tionary populists, at odds with each other on important questions.
In opposition to the reactionary power bloc are activated social movements, but no
national Left party that threatens capitalism. An expansionist and nationalist military pol-
icy may emerge, but such policies are highly controversial within military circles. And how
far attacks on democracy will go is an open question. There is no indication that a dictator-
ship of one section of the ruling class, pursuing the suppression of all basic constitutional
rights and all oppositional parties, is presently a danger although the overall weakness of
Trump’s power bloc among the elite may push him to use authoritarian measures to main-
tain control.
So how do we define the new power bloc? A good part of the new bloc is the old hege-
monic bloc of transnational capitalists. And racism, as Malcolm X said, “is as American as
apple pie.” So is there a qualitative difference in the Trump regime, a leap towards fascism,
or is it a quantitative change revealing much of what has always been present? Can we
properly use the term fascist for a system deeply embedded in transnational capitalist
relations of production, with a return to a nationalist based economy virtually impossible?
Have we moved away from a polyarchy (Robinson 1996), i.e., the rule of two parties play-
ing out their differences in a tightly controlled democracy? Or is the US an oligarchy of the
one-tenth of one percent consolidated around a new neo-fascist hegemonic bloc?
While a new power bloc is emerging, it is not hegemonic in the Gramscian sense that it
leads other capitalist sectors in an alliance, and suppresses those it does not lead. Conse-
quently, if we do use the term fascist to describe the current constellation of power, it must
be qualified with many differences from classic fascism, and in doing so it risks losing its
analytical power, causing distortions in tactics and strategy. Making similar errors in the
1950s and early 1970s led to a serious disorientation and mistakes for the Left.
We have raised a good number of questions, not all of which we have answers for. But
we believe there needs to be a tough and ongoing analysis. We face dangerous times. But if
we use a dialectical approach we can focus on the opposing forces that will be unleashed in
contradiction to the new power bloc. The Left must combine race and class, not class and
nation. In that lies our hope for defeating reactionary threats to democracy, and prevent-
ing the consolidation of an authoritarian racist regime.
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